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I. INTRODUCTION
ontroversy still abounds in the perennial debate over whether cer-
tain expenditures should be currently deducted as business ex-
penses under section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
(the Code) or capitalized under section 263.1 Nowhere is the debate
more heated than in the area of mergers and acquisitions. Corporate tax-
payers, the I.R.S., the United States Tax Court, and the Supreme Court
have wrestled with the deductibility of expenses, such as investment
banking fees and attorney's fees, incurred in takeover, merger, and reor-
ganization contexts. In the area of friendly takeovers, the Supreme Court
has put the issue of deductibility to rest in the landmark case of IN-
DOPCO v. Commissioner, which established the capitalization of ex-
penses incurred incident to a friendly merger. 2 However, in the hostile
takeover context, no clear cut line has been drawn. While the recent Sev-
enth Circuit's reversal of the controversial A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co.
v. Commissioner case may have offered temporary relief to corporate tax-
payers in the Seventh Circuit, the decision's guidance is tenuous at best.3
Still, the decision has renewed the debate over the proper tax treatment
such expenses should be given when incurred in a hostile takeover
setting.
This Comment agrees with the recent position taken by the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in Staley that such expenses, especially those
incurred by corporations defending against a hostile bidder, should be
deductible in the current taxable year under section 162. First, it will ex-
amine the background of deductibility and capitalization in general, as
well as the many factors articulated by the courts in determining whether
an expenditure should be deducted or capitalized. Next, it will outline
the historical tax treatment of expenses in takeover contexts, focussing
1. See C. Ellen MacNeil et al., Tax Accounting Issues in Mergers and Acquisitions, 372
PLI/TAx 577, 617 (1995).
2. 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
3. 119 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1997) (reversing the previously controversial Tax Court rul-
ing, 105 T.C. 166 (1995)).
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especially on the controversial Staley decision. Finally, it will consider the
many arguments in favor of current deductibility.
II. BACKGROUND
A. DEDUCTIONS IN GENERAL
A corporation's tax liability is determined by the amount of its taxable
income in a given year, 4 calculated as "gross income minus deductions
.... "5 Deductions are generally allowed under section 161 of the Code
as items specified in Part VI, subject to the general disallowance of de-
ductions provided in section 261.6
1. Characteristics and Treatment of Deductions
Deductions are "a matter of legislative grace."' 7 They are specifically
enumerated in the Code and are therefore "subject to disallowance in
favor of capitalization."'8 In contrast,
[n]on-deductible capital expenditures ... are not exhaustively enu-
merated in the Code; rather than providing a "complete list of non-
deductible expenditures," . . . § 263 serves as a general means of dis-
tinguishing capital expenditures from current expenses.... For these
reasons, deductions are strictly construed and allowed only "as there
is a clear provision therefore."9
Accordingly, deductions should be narrowly construed pursuant to
statute.10
Furthermore, the burden is on the taxpayer to prove the validity of a
deduction under section 162.11 In the takeover context, "In allocating the
professional expenses, the taxpayer ha[s] the burden of establishing
which litigation and other expenditures relate to resisting the hostile
takeover and [are] therefore deductible [in the current taxable year]. If
the taxpayer [does] not present sufficient evidence, all its expenses [have]
to be capitalized."'12
2. Purpose Behind Deductions
Proper allocation of deductible and non-deductible expenses is critical
to one of Congress's long-standing goals-to provide a clear reflection of
income. As such, "the Code endeavors to match expenses with the reve-
nues of the taxable period to which they are properly attributable,
4. See I.R.C. § 11(a) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
5. Id. § 63(a).
6. Id. § 161.
7. Interstate Transit Lines v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943).
8. INDOPCO v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992).
9. Id. (citations omitted).
10. See New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
11. See Interstate Transit, 319 U.S. at 593.
12. Melissa D. Ingalls, INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner: Determining the Taxable




thereby resulting in a more accurate calculation of net income for tax
purposes."' 13 Those expenditures that give rise to a benefit extending to
one or more future periods, or those that result in the acquisition of an
asset whose useful life is longer than one year, will be capitalized rather
than deducted.' 4 For purposes of computation, "the estimated useful life
of an asset is not necessarily the useful life inherent in the asset but is the
period over which the asset may reasonably be expected to be useful to
the taxpayer in his trade or business or in the production of his in-
come." 15 Furthermore, the Treasury Regulations explain that "[t]his pe-
riod shall be determined by reference to [the taxpayer's] experience with
similar property taking into account present conditions and probable fu-
ture developments. ' 16 Determining the useful life of an asset is subjec-
tive and speculative, and often serves as a point of contention between
taxpayers and the I.R.S. 17
3. Statutory Requirements for Business Deductions
Under section 162(a), a trade or business expense is deductible if it is
(1) ordinary and necessary; (2) an expense rather than capital expendi-
ture; (3) paid or incurred during the taxable year; and (4) made while
carrying on any trade or business. The taxpayer must clearly show all
four elements to obtain a deduction; otherwise, the expenditures will be
capitalized. 18
Determination of whether an expense meets the deductibility test out-
lined in section 162(a) usually revolves around the "ordinary and neces-
sary" requirement. This requirement has been difficult to define, and the
many cases that examine "ordinary and necessary" expenses have proven
troublesome to harmonize, as they involve the "appreciation of particular
situations" and "border-line conclusions.' 19
"Ordinary" can be described as that which is "normal, usual or custom-
ary" 20 and is generally thought to encompass expenses "of common or
frequent occurrence in the type of business involved."'21 However, the
Supreme Court has suggested that "[o]rdinary . . . does not mean...
13. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 84.
14. See Hotel Kingkade v. Comm'r, 180 F.2d 310, 312 (10th Cir. 1950).
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-l(b) (as amended in 1972).
16. Id.
17. See Ingalls, supra note 12, at 1209 n.23.
18. See I.R.C. § 162 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
19. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 116 (1933). For expenses found to be "ordinary"
see Commissioner v. People's Pittsburgh Trust Co., 60 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1932); American
Rolling Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 41 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1930); Corning Glass Works v.
Lucas, 37 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1929); Harris & Co. v. Lucas, 48 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1931). For
expenses found not to be "ordinary" see Hubinger v. Commissioner, 36 F.2d 724 (2d Cir.
1929); Lloyd v. Commissioner, 55 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1932); One Hundred Five West Fifty-
Fifth St. v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1930); Blackwell Oil & Gas Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 60 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1932); and White v. Commissioner, 61 F.2d 726 (9th Cir.
1932).
20. Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940).
21. Id. (citing Welch, 290 U.S. at 114).
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habitual or normal in the sense that the same taxpayer will have to make
them often .... [Some events] may happen once in a lifetime."'22 Courts
have allowed deductions under section 162(a) as "ordinary and neces-
sary," even though an event was unusual in the taxpayer's life. 23 How-
ever, the unusualness or non-recurring nature of an item can lead to
capitalization.2 4 In Motion Picture Capital Corp. v. Commissioner,2 5 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered legal fees and other ex-
penses incurred in connection with a merger and found them to be non-
deductible as they were unusual in the life of the corporation. The court
reasoned:
While it is true that they were ordinary and necessary expenses of
the merger and it may be true in broad concept that mergers are
ordinary and necessary business occurrences, . . . the expenses to be
deductible must be incurred by a taxpayer in doing the ordinary and
necessary things his business requires tobe [sic] done to make it func-
tion as such.2 6
The term "necessary" requires that, at a minimum, the expense be "ap-
propriate and helpful" for "the development of the [taxpayer's] business
.... -27 However, because the terms "appropriate" and "helpful" are so
broad, "almost any expense incurred in a taxpayer's business, from sala-
ries to staples, will be deemed 'necessary.' ' '2 8 An expense need not be
"indispensable" to be necessary.29
B. CAPITAL EXPENDITURES IN GENERAL
"A capital expenditure is an outlay of capital that results in the acquisi-
tion of property or a permanent improvement in the property's value.
' 30
Capital expenditures can be divided into two categories: those involving
tangible assets31 and those involving intangible assets. 32 The distinctive
tax treatment of tangible and intangible assets can be described as
follows:
22. Welch, 290 U.S. at 114.
23. See Locke Mfg. Cos. v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 80, 89 (D. Conn. 1964).
24. See Central Tex. Sav.& Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1183 (5th Cir.
1984) (one-time payment found to be a factor supporting capitalization).
25. 80 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1936).
26. Id. at 873-74.
27. Welch, 290 U.S. at 113.
28. Ingalls, supra note 12, at 1172.
29. See Sarah R. Lyke, INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner: National Starch Decision
Adds Wrinkles to Capital Expenditure Issue, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1239, 1241 (1994).
30. Ingalls, supra note 12, at 1169.
31. Property considered to be tangible includes buildings, equipment, and machinery.
See Ingalls, supra note 12, at 1209 n.26. The depreciation allowance for tangible property
"applies only to that part of the property which is subject to wear and tear, to decay or
decline from natural causes, to exhaustion, and to obsolescence." Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2
(1960).
32. Intangible property is more difficult to define. According to the Regulations, an
intangible asset is one that "is known.., to be of use in the business or in the production of
income for only a limited period .. " Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960). Examples of intan-
gible assets include patents and copyrights. See id.
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If the capital expenditure results in a tangible asset, the capital ex-
penditure is matched with income in the periods it benefits through
depreciation. If the capital outlay results in an intangible asset with a
determinable useful life, the capital expenditure made to acquire
that asset is matched with income in the periods it benefits through
amortization. However, intangible assets, like goodwill and going
concern value, in that their useful life cannot be ascertained with rea-
sonable accuracy, are not subject to the allowance for depreciation.
Money spent on such assets will produce little or no tax benefit to
the taxpayer since the taxpayer cannot recover the cost over time as
with depreciable assets. 33
C. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN CURRENTLY DEDUCTIBLE EXPENSES
AND CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
The I.R.S. and taxpayers often dispute whether an item is a deductible
expense or a capital expenditure. Section 263 serves as the general provi-
sion in distinguishing capital expenditures from current expenses. Gener-
ally, section 263(a)(1) provides that:
[N]o deduction shall be allowed for any amounts paid out for new
buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to
increase the value of any property or estate ... [or any amount
expended in restoring property or in making good the exhaustion
thereof for which an allowance is or has been made. 34
Historically, "[i]n the corporate context, an expenditure was capital in
nature if the expenditure bettered the corporation for: (1) the duration of
its existence; (2) the indefinite future; or (3) longer than the current taxa-
ble year."'35
For the corporate taxpayer the timing of cost recovery is the key advan-
tage of expense over capitalization. Expensing allows a taxpayer to im-
mediately deduct an item to produce lower taxable income, which
translates into more disposable income for a corporation in a given year.
In addition, items characterized as expenses allow the taxpayer to take
advantage of the time value of money.36 Conversely, capitalization pre-
vents "a taxpayer from utilizing currently a deduction properly attributa-
ble . . . to later tax years when the capital asset becomes income
producing.' '37 Rather the amounts are "amortized and depreciated over
the life of the relevant asset, or, where no specific asset or useful life can
be ascertained, is deducted upon dissolution of the enterprise. '38
33. Ingalls, supra note 12, at 1169-70.
34. I.R.C. § 263(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
35. Ingalls, supra note 12, at 1174.
36. See id. at 1170 ("Because of the time value of money, money is worth more to the
taxpayer now than if the taxpayer has it at some time in the future. Therefore, a deduction
to reduce current taxable income is more advantageous than a deduction which will reduce
future taxable income.").
37. Comm'r v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 16 (1974).
38. INDOPCO v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 83-84 (1992).
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In the context of takeovers, achieving deductibility over capitalization
is particularly important.
If expenses incurred by a target corporation during a takeover, for
example legal and investment banking fees which typically run into
the millions of dollars, are treated as capital expenditures, they cre-
ate an intangible asset. However, the useful life of the asset cannot
be determined. Thus, no deductions for depreciation or amortization
would be allowed. Consequently, the expenditures, if capital in na-
ture, have very little tax value. The only deduction given would be at
the dissolution of the enterprise. However, that possible future de-
duction is virtually worthless when compared to the much larger tax
benefit received if the expenses are treated as current deductions. 39
III. FACTORS CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING
CAPITALIZATION v. DEDUCTION
Because the Code fails to enumerate which expenses should be cur-
rently deducted and which should be capitalized, that determination has
largely been left to the courts. In the past, courts have looked to a variety
of factors in making this determination, including: the creation or en-
hancement of a separate and distinct asset; the existence of a future bene-
fit; the primary purpose versus the origin of the claim; and the voluntary
nature of the item.
A. CREATION OR ENHANCEMENT OF A SEPARATE AND
DISTINCT ASSET
While some courts have considered the existence of a separate or dis-
tinct asset to be sufficient for a finding of capitalization, it is not a neces-
sary element.40 It does not naturally follow that "only expenditures that
create or enhance separate and distinct assets are to be capitalized under
§ 263."41 In fact, deductibility has been allowed in cases where a separate
asset was created. In Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals determined that expenses incurred in expanding
a company's existing business were deductible. 42 Additionally, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in NCNB Corp. v. United States found
that deductible expenses were incurred in establishing a branch banking
system.43
B. EXISTENCE OF A FUTURE BENEFIT
As emphasized earlier, capitalization applies to assets whose useful life
39. Ingalls, supra note 12, at 1170-71.
40. See INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 87 ("[Tlhe mere presence of an incidental future bene-
fit-'some future aspect'-may not warrant capitalization ... .
41. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 86-87.
42. 475 F.2d 775, 782 (2d Cir. 1973).
43. 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982). But see Central Texas Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. United
States, 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding that a new bank branch created a new asset).
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extends "substantially beyond the taxable year."'44 The Treasury Regula-
tions further provide that "[i]f an expenditure results in the creation of an
asset having a useful life which extends substantially beyond the close of
the taxable year, such an expenditure may not be deductible, or may be
deductible only in part, for the taxable year in which made. '45
Courts have placed great weight on the existence of future benefits as a
way of differentiating between items that should be deducted and those
that should be capitalized. As the Supreme Court in INDOPCO empha-
sized, the realization of benefits beyond the taxable year is "undeniably
important in determining whether the appropriate tax treatment is [an]
immediate deduction or capitalization. '46 Despite the Court's support of
this "future benefits" test, the doctrine is "the source of much contro-
versy on capitalization issues arising today. '47
The Service has outlined the role of the "future benefits" test, as it
relates specifically to corporate takeovers, in the following way:
[T]he nature of a proposed corporate takeover (i.e., whether it is
friendly or hostile) is not determinative of the proper tax treatment
afforded to expenditures for professional fees. Rather, the proper
inquiry to be made with respect to these expenditures is whether the
target corporation obtained a long-term benefit as a result of making
the expenditures. The burden is on the taxpayer to demonstrate that
it did not obtain a long-term benefit.... Each case will turn on its
own specific set of facts and circumstances.4 8
Many of the facts and circumstances, however, lend themselves to a
finding of capitalization. For instance, "[e]xpenses incurred for the pur-
pose of changing the corporate structure for the benefit of future opera-
tions are not ordinary and necessary business expenses '49 and, therefore,
must be capitalized. Also, expenditures made with the corporation's op-
erations and betterment in mind will likely be deemed capital expendi-
tures, if their benefit is seen as extending beyond the taxable year. 50
It is important to note, however, that while the existence of a future
benefit favors capitalization, such a finding is not dispositive or conclu-
sive. 51 Some argue that INDOPCO should not be read so broadly.5 2
Rather, "a narrow reading [would] allows courts to make distinctions in
whatever way is politically expedient at the time."'53
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a) (as amended in 1987).
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1994).
46. INDOPCO v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. at 87.
47. MacNeil et al., supra note 1, at 617.
48. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-44-042 (July 1, 1991).
49. Farmers Union Corp. v. Comm'r, 300 F.2d 197, 200 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 861 (1962).
50. See General Bancshares Corp. v. Comm'r, 326 F.2d 712, 715 (8th Cir. 1964).
51. See United States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686, 689 (10th Cir. 1968); Cincinatti, New
Orleans & Texas Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 563, 568 (Ct. CI. 1970).
52. See Lyke, supra note 29, at 1253 ("The [INDOPCO] Court never said that the
existence of a future benefit must always result in capitalization ... .
53. Id. at 1256.
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Also, the duration of the benefit is only one factor to consider.5 4 For
example, some courts have found that incidental benefits should be ex-
cluded when considering the existence of long-term benefits. 55 One
Technical Advice Memorandum hinted that the fact that the determina-
tion of incidental benefit is subjective at best may be one reason for the
exclusion. 56
C. PRIMARY PURPOSE V. ORIGIN OF THE CLAIM
Another factor examined by the courts early on was the "primary pur-
pose" test.57 Under this approach, deductions were allowed if expenses
were made to benefit all shareholders and in defense of corporate policy
rather than for the benefit of particular shareholders or officers.58 In
Sammons v. Commissioner the Fifth Circuit justified the "primary pur-
pose" test in the following way:
[Tihe line between shareholder benefit and corporate benefit is not
always clear ... [b]ut this does not mean that where the primary or
dominant motivation for a distribution was to benefit the stock-
holder rather than the corporation that the articulation of a conced-
edly subordinate business justification should cause the entire
transaction to be recharacterized for tax purposes.59
Courts have approved the deductibility of expenses incurred "in a dispute
over basic corporate policy" as opposed to disputes over personalities, as
long as "the fees were reasonable in amount and were incurred for the
benefit of all the shareholders ...."60
In 1970, however, the Supreme Court rejected the "primary purpose"
test, instead favoring the "origin of the claim" test.61 In determining
whether an item is a deductible expense or a capital expenditure, the "or-
igin of the claim" test will look to the nature of the transaction and the
subsequent expenditure in controversy. 62 Unlike the "primary purpose"
test, the "origin of the claim" test will not consider the taxpayer's
motives.63
54. See NCNB Corp v. United States., 684 F.2d 285, 289 (4th Cir. 1982).
55. See National Starch & Chemical Corp. v. Comm'r, 93 T.C. 67, 76 (1989), aff'd, 503
U.S. 79 (1992); see also Rev. Rul. 94-12, 1994-8 I.R.B. 5.
56. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-02-004 (Sept. 10, 1993).
57. See Sammons v. Comm'r, 472 F.2d 449, 452 (5th Cir. 1972).
58. See Locke Mfg. Cos. v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 80, 86 (D. Conn. 1964).
59. Sammons, 472 F.2d at 452.
60. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 105 T.C. 166, 192 (1995) (citing Locke Mfg., 237
F. Supp. at 80).
61. See Woodward v. Comm'r, 397 U.S. 572 (1970); United States v. Hilton Hotels
Corp., 397 U.S. 580 (1970). The "origin of the claim" test was first articulated in United
States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).




D. VOLUNTARY NATURE OF THE ITEM
Another factor influencing courts is the voluntary nature of the ex-
pense incurred. Under this approach, "[a] deduction is more likely to be
allowed if the expense was forced upon the taxpayer against its will."'64
Conversely, a deduction that is voluntarily incurred by the taxpayer will
likely result in capitalization. However, as the case of Woolrich Woolen
Mills v. United States65 illustrates, the voluntariness of the deduction is
not conclusive. In Woolrich, the Third Circuit examined the issue of de-
ductibility in the context of whether or not the expense was voluntary.66
There, the taxpayer was required, under threat of injunction, to build a
wastewater filtration plant. Despite the involuntary nature of the ex-
pense, the taxpayer was forced to capitalize the costs associated with the
project because the life of the asset created was more than one year. 67
IV. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF DEDUCTIBILITY IN
TAKEOVER CONTEXTS
A. TAKEOVERS IN GENERAL
A takeover can be described as a "change in the controlling interest in
a corporation," whether by merger, acquisition, or other method, made in
either a friendly or hostile manner.68 Unlike friendly takeovers, which
involve corporate interest in and consent to the acquisition, hostile take-
overs "almost invariably involve a market purchase of all or a sufficient
amount of the targets companies' stock to insure control of the company
... I[following which] the acquiring corporation will be able to control the
operations of the company through its own board of directors .... ,,69
Such tactics are "often unfair and coercive to existing shareholders, 70
and, thus, a target corporation will not be inclined to accept this type of
unwelcome offer.
B. FRIENDLY TAKEOVERS: INDOPCO v. COMMISSIONER
In INDOPCO v. Commissioner,71 the Supreme Court examined
whether professional expenses incurred by a target corporation in the
course of a friendly takeover, such as investment banking, attorney fees
and other expenses, should be deductible by that corporation as "ordi-
64. Peter L. Faber, INDOPCO: The Still Unsolved Riddle, 47 TAX LAW. 607, 614
(1994).
65. 289 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1961).
66. Id. at 448.
67. See id. at 449.
68. See 19 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATMONS, at Glossary 26 (perm. ed. 1994).
69. Id. vol. 20, § 3:145.
70. Id. vol. 20, § 3:111.10.
71. 503 U.S. 79 (1992). The INDOPCO case began as National Starch & Chemical
Corp. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 67 (1989). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
affirmed the Tax Court's 1989 decision, which was later affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court in INDOPCO v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
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nary and necessary" business expenses under section 162(a). 72 In IN-
DOPCO, Unilever United States, Inc. expressed interest in acquiring one
of its suppliers, National Starch, in a friendly merger. Subsequently,
Unilever's attorneys negotiated to purchase shares of National Starch in a
"reverse subsidiary cash merger," under which "[t]wo new [transitory]
entities would be created-National Starch and Chemical Holding Corp.
(Holding), a subsidiary of Unilever, and NSC Merger Inc., a subsidiary of
Holding .... ,73 National Starch's board approved Unilever's final offer
of $73.50.
On its short-year tax return, National Starch deducted investment
banking, legal, and other expenses incurred in the friendly merger. After
a later audit, the I.R.S. disallowed the deductions and assessed a
deficiency.
In deciding this controversial case, the Supreme Court found that such
expenses did not qualify as "ordinary and necessary," and were therefore
not deductible in the current year because the "transaction produced sig-
nificant benefits to National Starch that extended beyond the tax year in
question. '74 The Court cited increased resources, synergy, transforma-
tion to a wholly owned subsidiary of Unilever, and relief of substantial
shareholder-related expenses, such as "reporting and disclosure obliga-
tions, proxy battles, and derivative suits" as long-term benefits derived
from the acquisition. 75 The Court ultimately concluded that the acquisi-
tion-related expenses were capital expenditures, not immediately
deductible. 76
1. Regulatory Limitations on the INDOPCO Holding
The holding in INDOPCO was limited, however, by later Revenue
Rulings. First, Revenue Ruling 92-80 expressly removed advertising ex-
penses from INDOPCO's reach. 77 There, the Service turned to section
1.162-1(a) of the Regulations, which expressly provides that "advertising
and other selling expenses" are to be included among the business ex-
penses for which deductibility is allowed. 78 The ruling explained that:
These costs are generally deductible under [section 162] even though
advertising may have some future effect on business activities, as in
the case of institutional or goodwill advertising .... Only in the unu-
72. See id. at 80.
73. Id. According to the plan, Holding would exchange shares of its non-voting pre-
ferred stock for National Starch common stock received from National Starch sharehold-
ers. In addition, National Starch common shares not exchanged in such a manner would
be "converted into cash in a merger of NSC Merger, Inc., into National Starch." Id.
74. Id. at 88.
75. Id. at 88-89.
76. See id. at 90. The I.R.S. viewed this holding as in-line with fundamental principles
of capitalization. See Rev. Rul. 94-12, 1994-8 I.R.B. 5, 1 C.B. 36 (stating that INDOPCO
did not change the fundamental principles governing capitalization); see also Rev. Rul. 94-
77, 1994-2 C.B. 825; Rev. Rul 95-32, 1995-16 I.R.B. 5.
77. Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57.
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (as amended in 1993).
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sual circumstances where advertising is directed towards obtaining
future benefits significantly beyond those traditionally associated
with ordinary product advertising or with institutional or goodwill
advertising, must the costs of that advertising be capitalized. 79
Based on this reasoning, the I.R.S. concluded that the INDOPCO deci-
sion did not alter the general deductibility of advertising costs as business
expenses under section 162 of the Code.80
Second, Revenue Ruling 94-77 limited INDOPCO's holding in relation
to severance payments. 81 There, the Service considered whether sever-
ance payments made during a period of business downsizing were deduct-
ible under section 162.82 Despite the fact that such payments could
produce "some future benefits," the I.R.S. concluded that the payments
"principally relate to previously rendered services" and therefore were
deductible. 83
2. Criticisms of INDOPCO
The Supreme Court's decision in INDOPCO has been criticized on a
variety of grounds. First, some have noted that the Court misplaced its
corporate structure analysis. 84
The [INDOPCO] Court further complicated matters by noting that
courts have long ruled that expenditures for changing corporate
structure are not deductible under I.R.C. section 162. However,
there was no change in the corporate structure of National Starch.
The cancellation of the authorized preferred stock and the reduction
of the number of outstanding common shares were not the type of
transactions that have been considered "corporate structure"
changes in the cases cited by the Court. The INDOPCO case merely
involved a shifting of stock ownership.8 5
The author of this critique concluded that "[t]he Court's analysis of IN-
DOPCO as a corporate restructuring was wholly misplaced and tends to
decrease the strength of the Court's overall rationale in determining that
the professional fees produced long-term benefits. '86
Other criticisms of the decision include the Court's failure to address
the fiduciary duty argument.8 7 In addition, one commentator cautions
against an expansive interpretation of INDOPCO, calling such a broad
79. Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57.
80. See id.
81. Rev. Rul. 94-77, 1994-2 C.B. 19.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. See Ingalls, supra note 12, at 1199-1200. Ingalls also criticized the Court for not
discussing the "origin of the claim" test, which the author thought to be valid. See id. at
1200.
85. Id. at 1199 (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 1199-1200.
87. See id. at 1200 (noting that the only court to address this issue was the Tax Court,
which found that the "board of directors' fiduciary duty to the shareholders was not the




Despite these criticisms, this Comment does not dispute the validity of
the INDOPCO holding as it relates to friendly takeovers because it cre-
ates a certainty for taxpayers in what appears to be a rather clear-cut,
non-deductibility situation. Rather, the main thrust of this Comment is
focused on INDOPCO's ill-application to the setting of hostile takeovers.
C. HOSTILE TAKEOVERS
1. The Service's Waffling Stance
The I.R.S. has taken conflicting stances on the issue of deductibility in
the hostile takeover context. These seemingly inconsistent opinions have
left taxpayers confused and uncertain as to the deductibility of expenses
they must incur in such situations.
Prior to the INDOPCO decision, the I.R.S. looked favorably upon the
deductibility of expenses incurred in defending against a hostile take-
over.89 In Technical Advice Memorandum 85-16-002, the I.R.S. found
that expenditures made in defending against a stock tender offer were
deductible.90 Interestingly, this memorandum was withdrawn by Techni-
cal Advice Memorandum 86-26-001, which found that greenmail pay-
ments, attorney's and broker's fees incident to a stock repurchase, were
capital expenditures. 91 The original Technical Advice Memorandum 85-
16-002 was later reinstated, as the I.R.S. again changed its mind, making
takeover expenses deductible in Technical Advice Memorandum 88-16-
005.92
Later, in Technical Advice Memorandum 89-27-005, the I.R.S. found
that fees incurred in hiring an investment banker to locate a white knight
in order to thwart hostile takeover attempts were made by the board of
directors in fulfillment of their fiduciary duties and were therefore de-
ductible. 93 One commentator has explained the decision in the following
way:
The I.R.S. found that the expenses were deductible because they
were incurred to insure the continued profitability of the business
and to protect the interests of the shareholders. The I.R.S. felt that
the taxpayer's expenditures were not made pursuant to an alteration
88. See Richard M. Lipton, Divided Tax Court Applies INDOPCO to Hostile Take-
overs, 84 J. TAX'N 21, at 1257-62 (1996).
89. See MacNeil et al., supra note 1, at 619.
90. Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-16-002 (Dec. 14, 1984).
91. Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-26-001 (Aug. 23, 1985).
92. Tech. Adv. Mem. 88-16-005 (Feb. 13, 1987).
93. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-27-005 (Mar. 27, 1989). This memorandum addressed the fol-
lowing facts: an acquirer made unwelcome attempts to takeover a target corporation by
acquiring 51% of the target's outstanding stock; the target's board of directors opposed the
acquirer's attempts to gain control; in defending itself, the target hired an investment
banker to assist in its defense; in its capacity, the investment banker found an alternative
suitor, a white knight; the target reached an agreement with the acquirer, under which the
acquirer would halt all further efforts to gain control of the target; and the white knight
acquired the target via later shareholder approval. See id.
16151998]
SMU LAW REVIEW
or change in the capital structure of the taxpayer for an extended
period of time. Rather, the amounts expended by the taxpayer were
in fulfillment of the Director's fiduciary duties to it and to fight off
what the Directors believed to be, a tender offer that was not in the
best interests of the corporation or its shareholders to accept. 94
The ruling in this memorandum was later revoked by Technical Advice
Memorandum 89-45-00395 because the I.R.S. "felt its position seemed
more liberal than the Tax Court's position in the... [INDOPCO] case."'96
Once again retreating from its earlier stance, the I.R.S. stated that
"[t]here is no less a long-term benefit to the target of a hostile takeover"
than to the target of a friendly takeover.97
Technical Advice Memorandum 90-43-003, which was based on a simi-
lar set of facts as Technical Advice Memorandum 89-27-005,98 received a
different treatment.99 There, the Service concluded that expenses in-
curred in finding a white knight that were made "with the intent to shift
ownership, and did result in the shift of ownership" were capital in na-
ture.100 In reaching this conclusion, the I.R.S. noted that this shift in
ownership was "intended to lead to a benefit that could be expected to
produce returns for many years in the future." 101 Interestingly, however,
the memorandum later found that those expenses directly relating to the
target's efforts to resist hostile takeover attempts were "ordinary and nec-
essary" business expenses and were therefore deductible in the current
year. 10 2
After the INDOPCO decision, the I.R.S. assessed tax deficiencies of
millions of dollars against corporate taxpayers involved in mergers and
acquisitions activity.103 The I.R.S. argued that no relevant difference ex-
isted between friendly and hostile takeovers and extended INDOPCO to
situations of hostile takeovers long before the original Staley decision. 10 4
In Technical Advice Memorandum 91-44-042, the I.R.S., acting consist-
ently with INDOPCO, found that costs incurred in resisting hostile take-
over attempts were capital expenditures and therefore not deductible
unless the corporation could show that no long-term benefit resulted. 10 5
Specifically, the I.R.S. disallowed three types of fees: "those of the target
for evaluating and resisting the tender offer, those that the corporation
94. MacNeil et al., supra note 1, at 619-20.
95. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-45-003 (Aug. 1, 1989).
96. Ingalls, supra note 12, at 1180.
97. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-45-003 (Aug. 1, 1989).
98. See supra note 95 for an explanation of the facts of this memorandum.




103. In one example, the I.R.S. assessed an $18 million deficiency against Chevron and
disallowed deductions for legal and investment banking fees and additional executive com-
pensation incurred in resisting an unsuccessful takeover attempt by Mesa Petroleum.
These deductions would have totaled $70.5 million. See Lee A. Sheppard, The INDOPCO
Case and Hostile Defense Expenses, 54 TAx NoTEs 1458, 1458 (1992).
104. See id
105. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-44-042 (July 1, 1991).
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incurred in repurchasing its stock from the corporate raider, and the
lump-sum reimbursement of the raider's expenses under a settlement
agreement. ' 106 In fact, "the I.R.S.'s latest position on a target corpora-
tion's takeover expenses is that the presence of a long-term benefit aris-
ing from the expense determines deductibility, regardless of the nature of
the takeover. No clear cut lines are drawn by this position.
10 7
2. Victory Markets & Subsidiaries, Inc. v. Commissioner
In Victory Markets, Inc. v. Commissioner,10 8 the taxpayer argued that
professional service fees incurred in connection with a hostile acquisition
of stock were entitled to deductibility. 10 9 While the taxpayer tried to dis-
tinguish its case from INDOPCO, the court declined to decide whether
INDOPCO's required capitalization of takeover expenses extended to
the hostile takeover context.' 10 The Tax Court found that, in actuality,
the Victory Markets takeover was not hostile and subsequently applied
the INDOPCO framework."'
3. Federated Department Stores
In a similar case, an Ohio bankruptcy court addressed whether Feder-
ated Department Stores, facing a hostile takeover, could deduct break-up
fees and reached a different result.112 In an effort to avoid a corporate
takeover by an unwelcome bidder, Federated Department Stores paid
break-up fees to white knights. After the merger attempts failed, Feder-
ated claimed the expenses as deductions. The district court upheld the
bankruptcy court's earlier holding that the deductions were allowable."
3
In so deciding, the district court distinguished Federated from INDOPCO
by noting that no benefit accrued beyond the year in which the expendi-
tures were made.114 In addition, the court decided that failed merger
transactions were distinct from successful takeovers."15 As such, aban-
doned transactions were found to be eligible for a section 165 loss
deduction. 116
4. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner
One the most controversial cases to come out of the United States Tax
Court was A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner.1 7 This case
directly addressed the issue remaining after INDOPCO of whether non-
106. Lyke, supra note 29, at 1270 n.138.
107. Ingalls, supra note 12, at 1183.
108. 99 T.C. 648, 657 (1992).
109. Id.
110. See id. at 668 n.4.
111. See id.
112. See In re Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 135 B.R. 950 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992).
113. See In re Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 171 B.R. 603, 613 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994).
114. See id. at 609.
115. See id. at 611.
116. See id. at 612-13.
117. 105 T.C. 166 (1995), rev'd, 119 F.3d, 482 (7th.Cir. 1997).
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deductibility of business expenses should be extended to situations in-
volving hostile rather than friendly takeovers. The Tax Court, in a
sharply divided decision, reluctantly answered in the affirmative. 1a8
However, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently reversed the Tax
Court's controversial decision.' 19
a. Facts
On April 8, 1988, Tate & Lyle PLC, a publicly held United Kingdom
corporation, made a public tender offer to Staley's 120 shareholders for
$32 per share of common stock' 2' "without the knowledge, endorsement,
or encouragement of the management or board of directors of [Sta-
ley].' 12 2 In response, Staley hired investment bankers First Boston and
Merrill Lynch to advise it. The investment bankers, believing that the
value of Staley's stock ranged from $35.83 to $43.57 per share, advised
Staley that the $32 per share tender offer was inadequate. Staley's board
of directors accordingly rejected the first tender offer. Then, on April 29,
again without solicitation, Tate & Lyle made a second attempt, raising its
tender offer to $35 per share. The second offer was again rejected by
Staley's board as "inadequate," and "not in the best interests of ... its
shareholders."' 23
Throughout the tender offer period, Staley continued to look for alter-
natives to the Tate & Lyle takeover. Unable to find "an alternative that
would create value for [Staley's] shareholders greater than the price that
Tate & Lyle was offering for the stock,"1124 the Staley board of directors
entered into a merger agreement, whereby Tate & Lyle agreed to buy
Staley for $36.50 per share of common stock.
On its short-year tax return, Staley deducted the investment banking
fees and printing costs. The Service, determining these expenses to be
non-deductible, assessed a deficiency of $3,544,166.
118. See id. at 200-01. Nine justices joined in the majority opinion, one of which con-
curred in result only. The remaining five justices filed dissenting opinions, arguing that the
majority failed to properly distinguish Staley from INDOPCO. See id. at 210.
119. See A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 119 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1997).
120. The company was first incorporated as A.E. Stanley Manufacturing Co. (AES) in
1906. In 1985, AES reorganized, forming Stanley Continental, Inc. (SCI), which served as
the parent company of AES and the newly acquired CFS Continental, Inc. (CFS), a lead-
ing food service industry supplier. Following the acquisition, Tate & Lyle sold the CFS unit
and changed SCI's name to A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. For simplicity and clarification,
this Comment will address the corporate entity as "Staley" in all references.
121. The offer was conditioned on:
(1) the nullification of the [Staley] shareholder rights plan; (2) the invalidity
or inapplicability of the restrictions on business combinations of DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1991) (Delaware anti-takeover statute); (3) the invalidity
or inapplicability of the [Staley] benefit trust; (4) satisfaction of a super ma-jority requirement contained in the certificate of incorporation of [Staley];
and (5) the shareholders of Tate & Lyle approving the offer.
Staley, 105 T.C. at 172.
122. Id. at 173.
123. Id. at 176-77.
124. Id. at 178.
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b. The Tax Court Holding
In deciding whether such fees and costs were deductible, the Tax Court
looked to the "nature of the transaction out of which the expenditures in
controversy arose"12 5 and the primary beneficiary of the acquisition. 126
In doing so, the sharply divided Tax Court found that regardless of Sta-
ley's motives for defending itself (i.e., fear of hostile takeover), the trans-
action was still a corporate reorganization in nature.12 7 In addition, the
court found that Staley received significant shareholder-related benefits
such as "transformation from a publicly held corporation to a wholly
owned subsidiary and relief from substantial shareholder-related
expenses."128
The court noted that the investment banking and printing fees were not
"related to current income production or needs of the immediate pres-
ent.' l2 9 The court also found that Tate & Lyle acquired Staley with the
intent of continuing its operations, not dissolving it. 130 Finally, the court
down-played the initial hostile nature of the takeover and instead focused
on the board of director's eventual acquiescence. 131 In particular, the
court emphasized the fact that the board "(1) approved a merger with
Tate & Lyle and (2) recommended Tate & Lyle's third offer to sharehold-
ers as 'fair' and in their 'best interests."' 1 32 Correspondingly, the Tax
Court determined that the expenses were "properly matched against rev-
enues of a taxable period ... longer than the taxable year during which
such fees were incurred," found the expenses to be capital expenditures
rather than deductions, and assessed a deficiency against Staley.'3 3
The majority was unpersuaded by Staley's argument that Tate & Lyle's
announced plans to fire Staley's management and break up the corpora-
tion distinguished this case from Victory Markets and National Starch, in
which the acquirers promised to keep the company intact and retain man-
agement. 34 Rather the court viewed Tate & Lyle's attempts as part of a
long-term plan to return Staley to its core businesses. 135
In an interesting twist of events, the merger did not result in tangible
future benefits to Staley. It could be argued that, on the contrary, the
merger negatively affected the corporate entity. Following the acquisi-
tion, Staley's senior management was replaced, 104 executives were fired,
and the entire board of directors resigned.136 In addition, rather ironi-
cally, the surviving corporation inherited the indebtedness that Tate &
125. Id. at 195.
126. See id. at 206.




131. See id. at 198.
132. Id. at 197.
133. Id. at 198.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 199.
136. See id. at 179.
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Lyle incurred in financing the acquisition. 137 Finally, Tate & Lyle forced
the sale of Staley's key food service supply division, a division that Staley
had previously acquired in a planned diversification attempt.138
c. The Seventh Circuit's Reversal
On July 2, 1997, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax
Court's controversial Staley decision. 139 While admitting that distinguish-
ing between expenses that are deductible under section 162 and those
that require capitalization under section 263 is "not an easy task,' 140 the
Seventh Circuit characterized the investment banking expenses as pri-
marily defending the corporation against attack,141 thus facilitating de-
ductibility rather than capitalization. 142 While the investment bankers
provided advice with respect to a variety of alternatives, including "recap-
italization, a leveraged buy-out, a placement of blocks of stock, a spin-off,
a public offering, and an offer to buy Tate & Lyle . . .," the court found
that "[n]one of these tasks served to facilitate the Tate & Lyle acquisi-
tion."'1 43 Furthermore, the court concluded that although the investment
bankers did perform some facilitative tasks, 144 "the bulk of costs at issue
... related to SCI's defense of its business and its corporate policy and
[were] therefore deductible under § 162(a)."'1 45 The court also distin-
guished the case at hand from that of INDOPCO in that, "unlike the
taxpayer in INDOPCO, [Staley] did not obtain a long-term benefit as a
result of making these expenditures" because the investment bankers' ef-
forts to help the corporation defend itself against the takeover proved
fruitless.' 46 As a result of these findings, the Seventh Circuit reversed the
Tax Court's judgment and remanded the case to the Tax Court "to allo-
cate a sum of the fees for capitalization to the facilitative activities of the
investment bankers and printer that were performed in preparing the
evaluation of SCI's stock and in facilitating the merger at the time of its
consummation.' 47 In concluding its decision, the Seventh Circuit urged
the I.R.S. to issue "precise regulations addressing this recurring problem
in American corporate life."'1 48
137. See id. at 180.
138. See id.
139. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 119 F.3d 482, 493 (7th Cir. 1997).
140. See id. at 487.
141. Id. at 489 ("It is clear that SCI was engaged in the process of defending its business
from attack.").
142. See id. at 488 (citing Allen v. Comm'r, 283 F.2d 785, 790-91 (7th Cir. 1960)
("[Ejxpenditures by a taxpayer to protect an established business are fully deductible as
ordinary business expense.").
143. Staley, 119 F.3d at 490.
144. The court made it clear that certain facilitative tasks, such as those that result in a
successful and welcome merger, must be capitalized. See id. at 491.
145. Id. In addition, the court noted that the expenses were deductible under section
165. See id.
146. Id. at 492.
147. Id. at 492-93.
148. Id. at 493.
1620 [Vol. 51
STALEY RIDES AGAIN
d. The Aftermath of Staley
While corporate taxpayers, at least those in the Seventh Circuit,
breathed a sigh of relief with the reversal of the Tax Court's decision in
Staley, cause for concern should remain. Since the Seventh Circuit's deci-
sion, a number of criticisms have emerged. One commentator criticized
the Seventh Circuit's reasoning as "out of left field," calling for the rever-
sal of the decision by the Supreme Court. 149 Another condemned the
decision on several grounds, arguing that there is little meaningful distinc-
tion between a hostile and a friendly takeover 150 and reasoning that "[i]n
every successful takeover, the target and acquiring corporations are ad-
verse as to price to be paid for the target shares, so every successful take-
over has hostility at the start of the negotiations. To separate out a
hostile part of the haggling over stock price in a single unitary takeover
on the basis of corporate motive is a rule inviting abuse."'151 In addition,
the IRS has vowed to pursue capitalization in Staley-type issues in the
future. 152 David L. Crawford, a branch chief in counsel of the IRS re-
cently remarked on the IRS's position post-Staley: "Our view of the
world is not changed by Staley. We will continue to look at the facts, and
if they indicate a substantial long-term beneficial consequence, we would
argue capitalization."
V. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF DEDUCTIBILITY
A. FIDUCIARY DUTIES IMPOSED ON DIRECTORS
In general, a board of directors functions for the benefit of the corpora-
tion's shareholders. 153 In the context of a takeover, directors have a
heightened fiduciary duty, which makes expenses incurred in responding
to such a situation "necessary." In responding to a hostile takeover, a
board of directors must show: 1) that it had reasonable grounds for be-
lieving that a genuine threat to corporate policy and effectiveness ex-
isted;154 and 2) that the response or defensive measure was "reasonable
in relation to the threat posed."'1 55 When a corporation undertakes a
149. Lee A. Sheppard, Will There Ever Be Another Friendly Takeover?, 76 TAX NOTEs
461, 462 (1997). Sheppard also argues that "there is really no such thing as a hostile take-
over." Id. at 461.
150. See Calvin H. Johnson, Snarling for the Cameras: Hostility and Takeover Expenses
Deductions, 76 TAx NOTES 689 (1997). Johnson also criticizes the decision on the grounds
that management hostility and failure to find a future benefit should not have been consid-
ered by the Seventh Circuit, and laments that the court "gave no considered judgment as to
whether the shareholder benefits (or even the tax-exempt nature of the sale to the corpora-
tion) might disallow the deduction .... " Id. at 690.
151. Id.
152. See Sheryl Stratton, IRS Has No Answers to Sticky Audit Issues Emerging Under
INDOPCO, 78 TAx NoTEs 659 (1998).
153. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991).
154. See Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petro-
leum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
155. Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 955. In determining whether a response is reasonable in
relation to a posed threat, the board may look to the "inadequacy of the price offered,
nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on 'constituencies' other
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transaction that will cause a break-up of the corporate entity or that will
cause a change in corporate control, however, the duties of directors must
shift to maximizing shareholder wealth first and foremost. 156 A sale of
total control is not required to trigger such a shift; a change in manage-
ment is enough. In addition, other principles guide a board of directors in
responding to takeover proposals in accordance with their fiduciary
duties:
(1) The board of directors must make a thorough, well-docu-
mented investigation before acting;
(2) Any defensive measure adopted by the board must be reason-
able in relation to the reasonably perceived threat posed by the take-
over bid; and
(3) If control of the corporation is to be sold, the board must not
interfere with the open, unrestrained bidding process. 157
But should the existence of a board's fiduciary duties to the share-
holder be weighed in favor of capitalization? Certainly not. In light of
such duties, it easily can be argued that expenditures made in defense of a
hostile acquirer's bid should not be capitalized but rather deducted in the
current year because such duties make the board's defenses "necessary."
In addition, such defenses are "ordinary" in that any and every board
would act in conformance with these fiduciary mandates.
B. FUTURE BENEFITS NOT APPLICABLE
Existence of benefits extending beyond the taxable year was the key
reason the Supreme Court rejected deductibility in INDOPCO.158 How-
ever, future benefits for a corporation in the process of defending itself
against a hostile takeover are at best questionable. Because a merger
conclusively generates income only in the year of the event, whether or
not the merger continues to be profitable remains to be seen. Once
purchased, the target company becomes the property of the acquirer who
may either destroy the target company and liquidate its assets, resulting
in no benefit for the corporation, or continue operating the company,
than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community
generally), the risk of non-consummation, and the quality of securities being offered in the
exchange." Id.
156. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986). The court in Revlon noted that when
it became apparent to all that the break-up of the company was inevitable,
... [t]he duty of the board had.., changed from the preservation of Revlon
as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for
the stockholders' benefit. This significantly altered the board's responsibili-
ties under the Unocal standards. It no longer faced threats to corporate pol-
icy and effectiveness, or to the stockholders' interests, from a grossly
inadequate bid.... The directors' role changed from defenders of the corpo-
rate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stock-
holders at a sale of the company.
Id.
157. WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
AND DIRECTORS § 15.01, at 481-82 (4th ed. 1988).
158. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
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with continuing benefit to both the entity and its new owners. As one
author noted:
Because the long-term benefits test is ambiguous to begin with, the
future benefits could be very speculative. If the board's decision to
maintain present ownership is a long-term benefit, then expenditures
to maintain that ownership would have to be capitalized as well....
The use of the long-term benefits test in hostile situations.., appears
misplaced, especially when defensive measures to protect a business
are involved.159
Consider a situation such as that in Staley, where the hostile acquirer
makes clear its intentions to fire the management and sell-off the corpo-
ration's key business.160 While this situation did not convince the Tax
Court in Staley to allow a deduction for the expenses incurred to defend
against the takeover,' 6 ' the Seventh Circuit was persuaded that at least
some of these expenditures were not "of value in more than the taxable
year."1 62
Additionally, the future benefits test depends on hindsight, only later
determining whether or not a benefit has actually been sustained by a
target corporation. This "hindsight-is-20/20" approach is unfair to a cor-
porate taxpayer seeking certainty and should not be used to determine
whether or not deductibility has been achieved, especially considering
that the expenses were incurred at a time when attempts to defend were
of paramount concern and no looking glass was available to determine
the probability of success. In the words of one author, "[w]hile a corpora-
tion is in the process of defending itself, it is not sure whether it will be
successful. The benefit of hindsight should not determine whether the
expenses are deductible.' '163
A special distinction must be made between successful and unsuccess-
ful takeover attempts when discussing the future benefits test. In the case
of successful takeover bids, INDOPCO's synergy criteria may be difficult
to apply.
The Court's approach [in INDOPCO] may be of little use where
such benefits and resulting synergy do not exist.... [M]any corpora-
tions engage in takeovers or mergers, not to make inroads into new
product lines or markets by developing their own products, but to
achieve such ends through diversification. If a corporation merges
with an existing business for [that] purpose, and that business is
wholly unrelated to existing business operations, the I.R.S. will find
it difficult to point to... synergy.., and thus will be unable to justify
capitalization on such grounds. 164
Thus, because "most corporations engage in takeovers as a means to di-
versify,... there will not be the same type of synergy found in [the IN-
159. Ingalls, supra note 12, at 1202-03.
160. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 127-40 and accompanying text.
162. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 119 F.3d 482, 492 (7th Cir. 1997).
163. Ingalls, supra note 12, at 1206.




As for unsuccessful takeover attempts, it can hardly be argued that any
long-term benefit results from such a situation. Generally, section 165
allows a deduction for "any loss sustained during the taxable year and not
compensated for by insurance or otherwise. 1 66 For a loss to be deducti-
ble under section 165, "a loss must be evidenced by closed and completed
transactions, fixed by identifiable events, and ... actually sustained dur-
ing the taxable year."' 167 In particular, subsection (f) addresses capital
losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets, allowing deductions "only
to the extent allowed in sections 1211 and 1212. '168 Section 1211 limits
corporate capital losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets to the
amount of gain from such sales or exchanges. 169 In addition, for corpo-
rate taxpayers capital losses may be carried back to each of the preceding
three taxable years to the extent that "the carryback of such loss does not
increase or produce a net operating loss (as defined in section 172(c)) for
the taxable year to which it is being carried back.' 170 Capital losses may
also be carried forward to each of the succeeding five years and "shall be
treated as a short-term capital loss in each such taxable year.' 171
Specifically, section 165 loss deductions have been allowed for expendi-
tures related to failed plans of reorganization and abandoned public of-
ferings. 172 In situations such as these, as well as in unsuccessful takeover
attempts, 173 deductions are justifiable in that they clearly produce no new
synergies or future benefits for the corporation. 174 The I.R.S. also seems
to have conceded this fact in Technical Advice Memorandum 85-16-002,
where it permitted a taxpayer to deduct break-up fees incurred in its
failed attempts to resist a corporate takeover. 175
In addition, two of the earlier-mentioned cases suggest that section 165
arguments will receive favorable response from the courts. In In re Fed-
erated Department Stores, the taxpayer successfully argued that the
break-up fees it had incurred qualified as deductible abandonment losses
under section 165.176 The bankruptcy court noted that target corpora-
165. Lyke, supra note 29, at 1261-62.
166. I.R.C. § 165(a) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
167. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(b) (as amended in 1977).
168. I.R.C. § 165(f) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
169. Id. § 1211(a).
170. Id. § 1212(a)(1)(A)(ii).
171. Id. § 1212(a)(1)(B), (C)(ii).
172. See El Paso Co. v. United States, 694 F.2d 703, 712 (Fed. Cir. 1982); Sibley, Lind-
say & Curr Co. v. Comm'r, 15 T.C. 106, 110 (1950) (where two out of three failed proposals
for capital restructuring were found to be "separate and distinct suggestions" deserving of
deductibility); Rev. Rul. 79-2, 1979-1 C.B. 98; Rev. Rul. 73-580, 1973-2 C.B. 86.
173. See Ingalls, supra note 12, at 1186 ("It is undisputed that expenses incident to an
unsuccessful defense by the target of a hostile takeover are immediately deductible as
abandonment losses under I.R.C. section 165(a).").
174. See Rev. Rul. 74-104, 1974-1 C.B. 70.
175. Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-16-002 (Dec. 14, 1984) (reinstated by Tech. Adv. Mem. 88-16-
005 (Feb. 13, 1987)).
176. 135 B.R. 950, 958, 960 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992). The court also found that these
break-up fees were deductible under section 162(a) as "ordinary and necessary." See id. at
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tions utilize "protracted and strenuous defensive tactics when faced, in-
voluntarily, with the threat of [a hostile takeover]."'1 77 In so deciding, the
bankruptcy court found it particularly important that no future benefits
had resulted and that the expenses had not been reimbursed by insur-
ance.178 In addition, the bankruptcy court found that expenses incurred
by the target to find a white knight were deductible under section 162(a)
as "necessary.' 1 79 It determined that "the decision to engage in a 'white
knight' defense was an established, common and accepted defensive
move, and thus would be considered 'ordinary' in the context of a hostile
takeover battle. ' 180 One author has noted that the bankruptcy court re-
jected the INDOPCO decision as controlling because it "dealt with the
denial of deductibility of expenses incurred in a successful friendly
takeover."'18
In addition, the taxpayer in Staley, while initially unsuccessful in its ar-
gument based on section 165,182 prevailed in the Seventh Circuit's review
of the case. 183 There, the court looked at the numerous failed attempts
by the investment bankers to engage in alternative capital transactions in
determining that section 165(a) permitted deductions for such costs as
abandoned capital transactions. 184
Some have argued that a pure long-term benefits test should not be
applied to hostile takeover defense costs whether or not the takeover at-
tempt is successful.' 85 In arguing for current deductibility of these ex-
penses regardless of outcome, one author stated:
If the defense is successful, the costs should be deductible both be-
cause it is well established that the costs of defending a business from
961. However, there is evidence that the IRS does not agree with this position as illus-
trated in a recent Tax Advice Memorandum, where the Service ruled against the taxpayer.
See Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-02-004 (Sept. 10, 1993). There, the taxpayer tried to deduct the
losses for six-sevenths of professional fees incurred in an eventually abandoned merger.
The I.R.S. found that such expenditures were not deductible because they were part of a
single plan of merger. See id.
177. In re Federated Dep't Stores, 135 B.R. at 961.
178. See id.
179. But see Lyke, supra note 29, at 1260.
[I]f the defense mechanism involves a so-called "white knight," it should be
more difficult for the taxpayer to avoid capitalizing the defense costs. White
knights bring potential benefits to target companies such as synergy and se-
curity from future hostile takeover attempts. Even in these cases, however,
costs might be deducted because the benefit is indirect and incidental and not
the primary purpose of the takeover defense.
Id.
180. In re Federated Dep't Stores, 135 B.R. at 961.
181. Ingalls, supra note 12, at 1187 (quoting In re Federated Dep't Stores, 135 B.R. at
962).
182. See A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 105 T.C. 166, 166 (1995) rev'd, 119 F.3d 482
(7th Cir. 1997).
183. See A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 119 F.3d 482, 490 (7th Cir. 1997).
184. See id. ("SCI contemplated numerous capital transactions that were later aban-
doned... when SCI agreed to the merger with Tate & Lyle. The fees paid to the invest-
ment bankers in connection with those abandoned transactions are therefore deductible as
abandonment loss under § 165(a).").
185. See Lyke, supra note 29, at 1258.
1998] 1625
SMU LAW REVIEW
attack are ordinary expenses and because such costs, like repair
costs, are incurred only to maintain the status quo. If the defense is
unsuccessful, the costs should also be currently deductible because
they should be considered part of an abandoned transaction that did
not produce long-term benefits. 186
C. DEFENDING AGAINST A HOSTILE TAKEOVER AS MAINTENANCE
One group of commentators has suggested that takeover expenses
"seem to be deductible under [the] well-established precedent that ex-
penditures to maintain one's property in efficient operating condition or
to protect one's business are deductible .... [C]osts are incurred simply
to maintain the status quo with any future benefit being a by-product of
that objective."'1 87 In so suggesting, proponents cite Revenue Ruling 94-
12, which holds that incidental repair expenditures are deductible when
spent to keep property in ordinary, efficient operating condition, despite
the fact that the expenditure might result in a future benefit.' 88 Revenue
Ruling 73-226 also supports this argument, holding that expenditures to
protect business reputation and goodwill were deductible even though
such expenditures helped a related corporation's continuing business.189
The rationale behind applying the maintenance argument to the hostile
takeover context can be explained as follows:
A corporation defending against a hostile takeover is trying to pro-
tect its current management structure and business practices-to
maintain the status quo-rather than create a new benefit. Like a
repair, the defense is not an improvement and thus yields no contin-
uing benefit; it merely enables the corporation to continue its opera-
tions as before. The defense does not enhance the value of the
corporation. Indeed, it may even reduce the value of the corporation
in the short term by diverting resources from normal business opera-
tions. Target corporations that successfully resist takeovers often
find themselves in an even worse position than before the takeover
attempt due to the debts they took on in defending themselves. 190
The dissent in the Tax Court's Staley decision noted that a target corpo-
ration will not likely view a hostile takeover as an opportunity for long-
term benefits. 191 In fact, "[d]efensive measures are not intended to pro-
duce lasting improvements; ... [they] are designed to prevent, not facili-
tate, a change in corporate structure.' 92
186. Id.
187. MacNeil et al., supra note 1, at 621-22; see also Lyke, supra note 30, at 1259.
188. See Rev. Rul. 9-12, 1994-8 I.R.B. 5.
189. Rev. Rul. 73-226, 1973-1 C.B. 62.
190. Lyke, supra note 30, at 1259.
191. See A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 105 T.C. 166, 210 (1995), rev'd, 119 F.3d 482
(7th Cir. 1997).
192. Lipton, supra note 88, at 26.
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D. DEFENDING BUSINESS REPUTATION AS JUSTIFICATION
Despite the negative treatment of business expenses incurred in a hos-
tile takeover, the Service has ruled favorably on expenses incurred in de-
fending business reputation. In a series of Revenue Rulings, the I.R.S.
found that such expenses should be immediately deductible despite the
existence of long-term benefits. 93
Courts also have found such expenses to be deductible. In BHA Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Commissioner, the taxpayer, a radio station, was subject to
revocation proceedings by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC).194 The proceedings resulted in the revocation of the taxpayer's
license, from which it appealed. 195 On appeal, the FCC reversed, and the
taxpayer subsequently deducted its legal fees. 196 The Tax Court found
that "[t]he legal fees were reasonable in amount and necessarily incurred
in defense of petitioner's position in the proceedings. Success by the FCC
in prosecuting its suit against petitioner would have prohibited further
operation of petitioner's business."'1 97 As such, the legal fees incurred in
defense of the suit were deductible because they "did not result in the
acquisition or disposition of a capital asset."'1 98
E. DEFENSE AGAINST ATTACK DOCTRINE
Traditionally, threats to a corporation have been considered currently
deductible under the "defense against attack" doctrine as espoused by
the Supreme Court in Welch v. Helvering.199 There, the court explained:
A lawsuit affecting the safety of a business may happen once in a
lifetime. The counsel fees may be so heavy that repetition is un-
likely. None the less, the expense is an ordinary one because we
know from experience that payments for such a purpose ... are the
common and accepted means of defense against attack.200
In Commissioner v. Heininger,20 1 the taxpayer hired an attorney to suc-
cessfully defend his business against government charges that would have
ruined his business. In upholding the deduction, the Supreme Court
found that the taxpayer's defense "was the response ordinarily to be ex-
pected... [having been] placed in a position in which not only his selling
methods but also the continued existence of his lawful business were
threatened with complete destruction. '2 0 2 The Court further concluded
that "[t]o say that this course of conduct and the expenses which it in-
193. See Rev. Rul. 73-226, 1973-1 C.B. 62; Rev. Rul. 76-203, 1976-1 C.B. 45; Rev. Rul.
79-283, 1979-2 C.B. 80.
194. 74 T.C. 593 (1980), acq. in part, 1982-2 C.B. 1.
195. See id. at 596.
196. See id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 596-97.
199. 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
200. Id. at 114.
201. 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
202. Id. at 471-72.
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volved were extraordinary or unnecessary would be to ignore the ways of
conduct and the forms of speech prevailing in the business world. '20 3
In a situation similar to a hostile takeover, courts have found that costs
incurred by a corporation defending against minority shareholder at-
tempts to seize control are deductible. 20 4 This analysis may be applied in
the takeover context given the similarities between the two situations.
Like hostile takeover bidders, minority shareholders attempt to acquire
voting control in order to direct the corporation's affairs. 20 5 In addition,
both the hostile tender offer and minority shareholder seeking control are
unwanted by management. 20 6
F. PUBLIC POLICY REASONS IN SUPPORT OF DEDUCTIBILITY
Congress has used the Internal Revenue Code as a tool to implement
policies and promote behaviors. In fact, "Congress has come to use the
tax code as a tool to do much more than raise revenue; it is used for such
varied things as furthering social goals such as 'fairness' and redistribu-
tion of wealth to stimulating capital formation and economic growth. '20 7
As a keeper of policy concerns "it would bode well for the I.R.S. to pro-
mote more logical policies," 208 rather than those that are "inconsistent
with social policies promoting positive behavior. '20 9
Treating friendly and hostile takeover expenses in exactly the same
manner ignores the differences in the transactions. Allowing hostile
takeover target corporations to deduct their defense expenses pro-
motes the policy of businesses defending and protecting themselves
when it is in their best interests. Without spending the money, the
business would probably no longer exist. And if that were desirable,
then the takeover would have been friendly, and the expenses would
have been capitalized under the long-term benefits test.210
In sum, allowing hostile takeover targets to deduct expenses incurred in
their defenses "promotes sound policy and does not give the target corpo-
ration a windfall for acquiring a capital asset. ' 211
VI. CONCLUSION
The issue of deductibility versus capitalization continues to be at the
forefront of many tax debates. Specifically, expenditures incurred by a
target corporation defending itself against a hostile acquirer have been
203. Id. at 472.
204. See Locke Mfg. Cos. v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 80 (D. Conn. 1964); Central
Foundry Co. v. Comm'r, 49 T.C. 234 (1967). But see Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. v. United
States, 974 F.2d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that premiums paid to shareholders to re-
deem shareholders' common stock are not deductible).
205. See Lyke, supra note 29, at 1259.
206. See id.
207. PHILLIP S. ASHLEY, SELECrED READINGS IN TAX POLICY 1 (1992).
208. Ingalls, supra note 12, at 1205.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1206.
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the subject of special controversy, especially as of late given the contro-
versial Staley case. Despite the favorable Seventh Circuit decision and
the many powerful arguments supporting deductibility, corporate taxpay-
ers must tread cautiously through the uncertain tax waters when charac-
terizing their hostile takeover expenses.
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